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TRUST INVESTMENT CLAUSES:
A PROBLEM FOR DRAFTSMEN
"Every testator, by the law of the land,
is at liberty to adopt his own nonsense
in disposing of his property."
- Vice-Chancellor Shadwell, quoted in Boullo
v. Tompkins, 5 Redf. 472, 478 (N. Y. 1882).
When a man sits down with his lawyer to set up a trust, probably no deci-
sion which the two will have to make is more important than that of how
the trustee is to invest the funds put in his care. And in no other part of the
trust instrument can nonsense, if permitted to enter, produce more trouble
for the trustee and the beneficiaries.
The investment clause of the Will or the deed of trust really presents two
problems: the donor, or perhaps the lawyer, must decide what kind of in-
vestments the trustee may make, and the lawyer must draft language for
the trust instrument which will accomplish the desired result.
The donor must be quite careful in making his decision because the law
says that his directions are to be followed literally, regardless of whether
they are wise or for the best interests of the beneficiaries.' If the donor
chooses too conservative an investment policy, the life tenants may get too
small an income; equally, an overly liberal investment policy will jeopardize
the safety of the principal which is to go to the remaindermen.
The lawyer must be even more careful in drafting the investment clause,
since an error on his part will not only hurt the beneficiaries, but may cost
the trustee money. If the language is ambiguous and the trustee makes
investments which a court later finds not to have been authorized by its
reading of the instrument, the trustee is likely to have to make up to the
beneficiaries any losses suffered on the unauthorized investments.' This
1. 3 BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 681 (1946) ; 2 Scot, THE LAW
OF TRusTs § 227.14 (1939) (cited hereafter as BOGERT and ScorT respectively). "It Is
fundamental law that a testator or the creator of a trust has unlimited authority to direct
how his money may be invested by his trustees, or may leave the matter of such invest-
ment completely in the discretion of such trustees." Matter of Reid, 170 App. Div. 631,
634, 156 N. Y. Supp. 500, 502 (1st Dep't 1915). The intention of the donor is to be fol-
lowed even where he has directed speculative and hazardous investments. Greenhouse's
Trust Estate, 338 Pa. 144, 12 A.2d 96 (1940). Contra: Gould v. Gould, 126 Misc. 54, 213
N. Y. Supp. 286 (Sup. Ct. 1925), where the will gave the trustee power to invest In
non-legals and specifically said that the trustee should not be liable for any resulting
loss. The court permitted the trustee to be surcharged for the purchase of certain stocks,
saying: "But authorizing a trustee to make such investments as he may think proper does
not confer an unlimited power in the use of the trust property .... Although the will
did not confine the trustees to so-called legal investments . . . [they] were not authorized
to conduct a business or to finance railroads or to speculate in future values of rail-
roads." Id. at 62, 213 N. Y. Supp. at 294-5.
2. 3 BOGERT § 708; Moore, A Rationalization of Trust Surchargc Cases, 96 U or
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possibility tends to make the trustee very conservative in interpreting the
investment clause; even though the clause may have seemed clear to the
lawyer who drafted it, the beneficiaries will not benefit from such liberal
provisions as it may contain if the wary trustee finds any ambiguity in the
language. And the trustee may well be right, since a carelessly drawn in-
strument can create an investment power far different from that originally
intended.
CHOOSING THE INVESTMENT POWE R
Three general possibilities lie before the donor in defining the magnitude
of his trustee's investment power. He may restrict the trustee to ultra-
conservative investments; these he may enumerate himself or he may, in
many states, restrict investment to a "legal list"-a collection, usually de-
fined by statute, of the bluest chips, promising small but steady income and
bedrock stability.3 Or he may select a number of specific investments or
types of investments among which his trustee may choose. Finally, he may
give the trustee "full power" to make his own selections. Although the
limits of a full power are not precisely defined, the term seems usually to
permit the trustee to purchase, after careful investigation, almost any
security that is well-seasoned and non-speculative.4
Although the special circumstances of the donor, the size of the fund, the
beneficiaries, etc., will of course dictate the choice made, in most cases the
donor will find that a grant of full power to the trustee is best for the bene-
P.A. L. R.-v. 647 (1948); Comment, Legal Lists in Trust Investment, 49 YA L. J. 691
(1940).
3. An excellent and well annotated Comment, 49 Ymm L. J. 891 (1940), is the best
of the wealth of articles on legal lists. Much discussion has taken place in the periodicals
attempting to distinguish between "mandatory" and "permissive" statutes. In theory the
trustee who invests under a mandatory statute is required to stay within the list and must
invest prudently even within those limits. Where a permissive statute governs, the trustee
is protected if he invests within the list and may make other investments outside the list
if he can show that he acted prudently. The distinction seems actually to be nonexistent
in practice, since the trustee who stays within a mandatory list is almost never surcharged,
while the trustee who goes beyond the list in a state with a permissive statute has very
little chance of convincing a court that he acted with sufficient prudence to avoid surcharge.
The risk involved is so great that few trustees ever dare to invest outside the legal list
even where the statute is only "permissive."
In the following list of states with legal list statutes, the states where the statute is
thought to be permissive rather than mandatory are italicized: Alabama, Aris;:a, Arhan-
sas, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Nerw Jersey, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Caro-
lina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
8 P-H TRUST SERv. 1 15,301 (1948). Mississippi has no statutory list, but it is said that
chancellors are assisted in deciding what are proper investments by the statutes with re-
spect to the investment of sinking funds of tax districts. 3 BoGamr § 638.
4. 3 Bommr § 682; 2 Scorr § 227.14. Should the settlor desire to authorize more
hazardous undertakings his task is not easy. See discussion, note 31 infra.
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ficiaries, best for the trustee, and best for the economy. The most obvious
advantage of such a grant is that it should result in more income for the
life tenant, who usually is the donor's wife or child. Most donors who con-
sider the matter are willing to risk possible shrinkage in the amount which
will go to the distant connections named remaindermen in order to assure
an adequate income for the immediate dependents who are life tenants.5
Both the life tenant and the remaindermen benefit from the growth factor
inherent in the equity securities permitted only in full power portfolios.
Common stocks have proven over the years to be an excellent hedge against
inflation. Even when-as now-the prices of stocks fail fully to reflect a
boom, the increased dividends which stocks pay in times of prosperity make
the high cost of living less onerous to life tenants.
It cannot be denied that there may be an element of risk in the purchase
of non-legals, but even the legal list securities are far from being absolutely
safe. Municipalities do default on their bonds. The woe caused many
trusts which held mortgages on real estate during the depression has left
trust company files bulging with requests from beneficiaries to refrain from
taking such mortgages, even though they are highly favored by legal lists.
The melancholy experience of railroad securities is well known. Many trusts
which were invested in non-legals certainly underwent similar misfortune,
but these trusts had at least the solace of having received a more ample
income in normal times. Moreover, the trustee without power to take
remedial action on a broad scale found himself limited to expressions of
commiseration. This inflexibility objection applies also to the establish-
ment of a special investment power. The comparative safety of various
types of investments changes with the years, and a donor who relies on his
own judgment will leave his trustee powerless when that judgment becomes
outmoded.6
In addition to the benefits it presents to the trust itself, a grant of full
5. Stone, Life Tenant vs. Rentainderman, 84 TRUSTS & ESTATES 530 (1947). Stone
suggests that, since the life tenants are usually the primary objects of the donor's affec-
tion, all legal rules of construction should be resolved in favor of life tenants, and trustees
should depart from their usual conservative investment policies in order to obtain a larger
income for the life tenant. In the course of a very muddy opinion, one court claims to
have found indications in the case law that investment powers will in fact be interpreted
more liberally where the beneficiaries include the widow or children of the testator, Mat-
ter of Hess, 171 Misc. 690, 13 N. Y. S.2d 701 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
6. "Who should know better than he how to invest and dispose of his money after
his death? The only answer is: Time marches on. Thoughtless, playful children grow
into serious-minded resourceful adults. Healthy, prosperous adults suffer illness, failure
and the other casualties of life. The gilt-edge bonds of today are the cats-and-dogs of
tomorrow. To regulate events in 1960 the judgment of a mediocre mind on the spot Is
incomparably preferable to the guess in 1940 of the greatest man who ever lived." LrAcui,
CASES AND MATERILS ON FUTURE INTERESTS 240 (2d ed. 1940). See also Alton, Suikqes-
tions for Drafting Trusts, 83 TRUSTS & ESTATES 392, 393 (1946), reprinted as Some
Practical Remarks About Trust Clauses, 26 ORE. L. REv. 39, 45 (1946).
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power to the trustee is desirable because it permits the funds of the trust to
play a necessary role in the nation's economy. The greatest economic need
in this country at the present time is for risk capital.7 More than thirty-six
billions of dollars are today held in trust,8 to a large extent unavailable as a
possible source of such capital; prospective testators and settlors can per-
form a real public service by not further contributing to this process of
financial inbreeding. And the notion that trust investment power has
direct economic effects is not newY The common law originally sanctioned
government consols as almost the only proper investment for a fiduciary
largely because of the government's need for great quantities of borrowed
capital. 0
Finally, substantial trust investment in equity securities might very well
redound to the benefit of more conservative holdings, for it is at least argua-
ble that the vast sums of trust money which bid for the restricted classes
of securities authorized by law are a major cause of the low return on legals.
A discretionary investment power offers such great advantages to the
donor concerned with the welfare of his beneficiaries and of the economy
that it is not surprising to find that an increasingly large number of trust
instruments contain a clause giving the trustee full power over invest-
ments."
7. EcoNoMc REPORTS OF TE PREsiDENT Part I, cc. 1, 4 (194S). The economic ef-
fects of trust investments are analogous to those of investment by life insurance companies,
just as the restrictions on trust investment are motivated by considerations similar to
those which impel regulation of insurance companies. The economic problems presented by
insurance company investment have been exhaustively analyzed in a Comment, Statutory
Regulation of Life Insurance Investment, 57 YALF L. J. 1256 (1943).
8. Stephenson, Trust Business in the United States 1947, 7 Tnus Bua. 19 (1943).
9. A grant of full power makes it unnecessary for a court to have to stretch so far to
reach an economically desirable result as the courts did in Matter of London, 104 Misc.
372, 171 N. Y. Supp. 981 (Surr. Ct. 1918). The investment clause there required that
the trust be invested in railroad bonds paying at least four percent. The trustee was sur-
charged for losses sustained on the purchase of some New York City bonds, but the court,
in a fine patriotic fervor, refused to surcharge for losses incurred on Liberty Loan Bonds.
The Surrogate argued that the testator could not have foreseen the government's need
of money with which to wage a war, and said: ". . . I feel that were he alive he would
have invested in these bonds." Id. at 377, 171 N. Y. Supp. at 984. Although the result
reached seems eminently desirable, the decision has been disapproved by a number of
legal commentators. The HAvARR LAw Rnwv says that the Surrogate sanctioned the
patriotic motives of the trustees at the expense of the beneficiaries, 32 HAnv. L. RLv. 181
(1918), while Professor Scott calls the decision "a case which goes to the verge or be-
yond," and says that "it is doubtful whether most courts would feel that the circumstances
would justify them in permitting such deviation." 2 ScoTr § '-7.14.
10. Comment, 49 YAL L. J. 891, S92 n. S (1940) ; ef. Matter of London, supra note 9.
11. "The records of Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Company of Philadelphia show ap-
proximately S0% of the trust instruments accepted by them in the last ten years contain
full power investment clauses. Of the remaining 20% about half contain special investment
provisions, and half restrict the Trustee to legal investments.... In the past tventy-five
or thirty years the trend has been toward liberalizing the powers of investment of the
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THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
DRAFTING THE INVESTMENT CLAUSE
The substantive scope of the trustee's investment discretion determined,
the problem of implementing the decision faces the draftsman squarely. The
difficulties vary with the objective sought.
Conservative Investment Power
In states having a legal list of investments for trustees, the donor who
wishes to limit his trustee to highly conservative holdings need but remain
silent. Having grown up in the days when only government bonds and real
securities were thought to be safe enough for a man investing another man's
money, the law does its best to confine trustees to the limits of the legal
list.12 Not only will the silent donor be supposed to have intended invest-
ment only in legals, but the donor who fails to express his wish for a broader
power with the utmost clearness will have his trustee similarly limited. The
benefit of any doubt which exists will always be given in favor of the legal
list as against full power.' 3 Many states, however, have no legal list. There,
the donor who remains silent will confer upon his trustee the broad dis-
cretion of a "prudent man" managing his own property. 14 In "prudent man"
states, therefore, the donor who wishes to confine his trustee more narrowly
must enumerate the permissible investments. Since this task is similar to
that of the donor in a legal list state who wishes to create a special invest-
ment power for his trustee, it will be covered by discussion of the latter.
Trustee. Whether this is the result of a better understanding of the investment problems
'of fiduciaries by the Bar, or by the creators of the trusts, I can not say-perhaps it is a
combination of both." Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from E. W. Bainbridge,
Trust Officer, Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Company, December 20, 1948,
See also RIDDL , THE INVESTMENT PoLIcy OF TRUST INSTITUTIONS 284 (1934);
Morris, Problems in the Drafting and Administration of Trusts, 26 MARQ. L. RnV. 57, 61
(1942). For a cynical and rather disapproving view of the same tendency, see Comment,
Legal Lists in Trust Investment, 49 YALE L. J. 891, 907 (1940).
12. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 227b (1935) ; 2 ScoTT § 227.12.
13. See note 33 infra.
14. The leading case establishing the "prudent man" rule is Harvard College V.
Amory, 9 Pick. 446 (Mass. 1830), where the court said, at 461: "All that can be re-
quired of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall conduct himself faithfully and exercise a
sound discretion. He is to observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence man-
age their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposi-
tion of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the
capital to be invested." Cf. King v. Talbot, 40 N. Y. 76 (1869). The "prudent man" rule
is in effect in California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and
Washington. 8 P-H TRUST SEav. 15,301 (1948).
There is a tremendous literature discussing the rule. Possibly the best article Is
Shattuck, The Massachusetts Prudent Man in Trust Investments, 25 B. U. L. Rzv. 307
(1945). Moore, supra note 2, presents a brilliant analysis of the factors governing judicial
response to particular investments. The analysis is applicable to states with legal lists as
well as to "prudent mane' states.
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There is a substantial danger in saying anything at all where legals are
desired,' 5 as is illustrated by recent changes in the Fiduciary Act of Penn-
sylvania., For years the Act had permitted the usual assortment of high
grade bonds and mortgages. During that period many a donor empowered
his trustee to purchase "legal interest-bearing securities." In 1947 the
legislature amended the legal list to include certain preferred stocks.1 7
Pennsylvania decisions indicate that preferred stocks can probably not be
regarded as "interest-bearing." 18 Therefore trusts using the language
quoted must now be regarded as permitting an even narrower class of in-
vestments than that which the legislature regards as safe for fiduciaries.
There is a good possibility that the Pennsylvania court may be influenced
by the legislative action sufficiently to hold that "legal interest-bearing
securities" includes any security on the legal list. Rationalizations are
available to justify such a result. 9 But until the court does so rule, it would
15. Recent New York decisions highlight a few of the problems which can arise
when investment clauses speak of legal securities. In In re Hoyt's Estate, 294 N. Y. 373, 62
N. E2d 609 (1945), 46 CoL L. REv. 154 (1946), 32 VA. L. REv. 426 (1946), the instru-
ment directed investment ". . . only in such securities as savings banks under the Bank-
ing Laws of New York are expressly authorized to invest deposits." The applicable bank-
ing law at that time of testator's death allowed investment in mortgages but did not
expressly authorize mortgage participations, and the court allowed the trustees to be
surcharged for purchasing mortgage participations. Cf. Matter of Putnam, 42 N. Y. S.2d
367 (Surr. Ct 1943), where the donor said: "I ... direct that my said trustees need not
be limited to investments required for savings banks." The court found a few trivial in-
stances in which the legal limits of investment for trustees were broader than for savings
banks, and held that the language did not authorize purchase of securities not legal for
trustees. Compare President & Directors v. Erlandsen, 36 N. Y. S2d 136 (Sup. Ct. 1942),
aff'd per curiam, 266 App. Div. 8M3, 43 N. Y. S2d 639 (2d Dep't 1943) (non-guaranteed
mortgage certificate on legal list held improper investment where instrument authorized
"... guaranteed first mortgages, guaranteed first mortgage certificates, or in such other
securities as may be legal for the investment of trust funds"), aith In re McIntyre's Es-
tate, 249 App. Div. 833, 292 N. Y. Supp. 746 (2d Dep't 1937), aff'd per curi am, 275 N. Y.
603, 11 N. E.2d 776 (1937) (non-guaranteed mortgage on legal list held proper invest-
ment where will authorized "... those investments prescribed by law for trustees and
no other save bonds or mortgages fully guaranteed").
16. PA_ STAT. Ax., tit. 20, § S01 (Purdon, Supp. 1948).
17. Id. at § 801-16. In order to be eligible, preferred stocks must be listed on the New
York Stock Exchange, must have been approved by any appropriate state or federal regu-
latory bodies supervising the issuing corporation, and must be shares in a corporation
which in the past ten years has never defaulted in the payment of preferred dividends and
which has earned a net profit after all interest, expenses, and taxes, in at least eight of
those years.
18. See notes 45 and 47 infra.
19. In Craven's Estate, 25 Pa. D. & C. 2S9 (1935), the will authorized investment
in ".... bonds secured by mortgages, or loans of the United States of America, State of
Pennsylvania or City of Philadelphia." There was no language to indicate any further
power to invest in such other securities as might be legal. The Orphan's Court claimed
to find that the class of securities permitted by the instrument was coextensive with the
class of securities authorized as legal investments at the time the will was dravm. It held,
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be a brave trustee indeed who would take advantage of the modernization
of the legal list to purchase preferred stock for such a trust.
Special Investment Power
The most difficult problems in draftsmanship are caused by those donors
who wish to give their trustee an investment power different from both full
power and the legal list. They must construct an entire investment standard
of their own, a task which has taken the law many statutes and much litiga-
tion to accomplish. Even if the donor is successful, his effort is probably
ill-advised, since the trustee can usually formulate a sounder investment
policy at the time of investment than can the donor years in advance. And
such directions add to the difficulties and expense of administering the trust.
But if the donor is persistent in his desire for a special investment power,
the easiest and safest method of setting out the new investment standard is to
take the standard of legal list or full power as a frame of reference, and then
prescribe such additions to or subtractions from this standard as seem desir-
able to the donor. Very few problems will arise if the direction is to invest in
"railroad stocks and such securities as may be legal for trustees," 20 or if
therefore, that by the language quoted the testator was saying in effect that the trustee
might invest in legal securities, and that he merely chose to define such an investment
power by specification, rather than by using the shorthand phrase, "legal investments."
The trustee in this case had purchased mortgage participation certificates, a form of
security which did not become a legal investment until some years after the testator's
death, but having interpreted the will as giving a legal power of investment, the court
refused to hold the trustee liable.
An analogy can be erected between Craven's Estate and trusts which speak of "legal
interest-bearing securities" or indicate the same thing by equivalent language. When in-
struments drawn prior to 1947 used such a phrase, they were describing a class coex-
tensive with legals generally. Under the Craven rule, the trustee under such an instru-
ment is still cloaked with a full legal power, even though the legislature has seen fit to
permit certain restricted investments in securities which are not, strictly speaking, "in-
terest-bearing."
Of course Craven's Estate is only a lower court decision, and its authority is further
weakened by the almost desperate over-ingenuity which the court was forced to employ to
reach its result. Some support for such an argument as that outlined can be found hi
another 1947 amendment to the Fiduciaries Act, which specified that "... the terms 'legal
investment' or 'authorized investment' or words of similar import as used in . .. [the
trust instrument] . .. shall be taken to mean any investment permitted under the terms
of ... [the legal list]." PA. STAT. ANx., tit. 20, § 801-17b (Purdon, Supp. 1948). Such
arguments may prove convincing to any court too timid to face up to the fact that "legal
interest-bearing securities" and similar phrases are legal cliches tossed in to Impress
donors who obviously had no desire to limit their trustee any more severely than tile
legislature limited him. See Haggerty, Some Aspects of the Obligations of New York
Fiduciaries With Respect to the Making and Retention of Investments, 16 Fono. L. Ruv. 1,
153 (1947), who says, at 9: "It should be realized that very often, the words used or the
phrases employed should not be analyzed literally, because they are legal 'cliches' If not
idioms, and hence meaningless if considered by themselves."
20. Cf. In re Harbeck's Estate, 142 Misc. 57, 254 N. Y. Supp. 312 (Surr. Ct, 1931).
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the trustee is authorized "to make any kind of investment, whether or not
legal, except mortgages on real estate." 21
It is when the donor attempts to specify all the types of permissible in-
vestments-as he must, in a "prudent man" state where he wishes conserv-
ative investments-that really grave dangers are likely to be encountered.
Where the instrument permits purchase of "mortgages," are mortgage
participations proper investments?2 Will the trustee be surcharged who
purchases municipal bonds or school district bonds when the will mentioned
only "state and government bonds"? 23 Is a debenture a "bond or obliga-
tion?" 24 As the examples indicate, no matter how specific the language
used, it is rare that every possible kind of investment is considered and
either banned or definitely permitted.
2 5
Another problem which recurs frequently when donors attempt to set up
a special investment power is whether mention of a particular type or types
But cf. Matter of Hepburn, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 23, 1934, p. 1407, cols. 5, 6 (Surr. Ct.),
where a direction to invest in ". . . government bonds or securities of like character" was
held to mean United States Bonds, state bonds, or "good" municipals, but not to include
legals generally.
21. But cf. Jones v. First Minneapolis Trust Co., 202 Min. 187, 277 N. W. 89
(1938), 22 MixN. L. REV. 1070, in which it was held that a grant of power to invest in
".... first mortgages or improved real estate, tin municipal or corporation bonds or in
any other form of income bearing property, except real estate.. ." did not grant au-
thority to invest in corporate stock. The court refused to reverse its construction of that
will even after the adoption by Minnesota of a "prudent man" statute which specifically
authorized investment in stocks. In re Jones' Will, 221 Minn. 524, 22 N. W2d 633 (1946).
22. Yes: Paul's Estate, 338 Pa. 191, 12 A.2d 565 (1940) ; Dillon's Estate, 324 Pa. 252,
188 Atl. 134 (1936); D'Happart's Estate, 132 Pa. Super. 32-6, 200 At. 927 (1938);
Craven's Estate, 25 Pa. D. & C. 289 (1935). No: In re Shaw's Estate, 122 N. J. Eq. 536,
195 Atl. 525 (1937) ; In re Haydocks Estate, 158 Misc. 404, 284 N. Y. Supp. 931 (Surr.
Ct 1935) ; Matter of Waxelbaum, 156 Mlisc. 45, 281 N. Y. Supp. 1F6 (Surr. Ct. 1935) ;
In re Mendel's Will, 164 Wis. 136, 159 N. IV. '26 (1916); 3 Bocanr § 63. Maybe:
NossAAAN, TRusT Am sITSRATiox AN TAXATio § 459 (1945).
23. Yes: Matter of Stillman, 53 N. Y. S.2d 718 (Sur. Ct. 1945). Just as a trustee
directed to purchase bonds of any "British colony or dependency" may not purchase
bonds of a province of Canada. In re Sir S. M. Afaryon-Wilson's Estate, [1912] 1 Ch. 55.
But cf. Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown, 105 Conn. 261, 135 Atl 555 (1926).
24. Probably. Although it is conceivable that dcisdcm gcmeris might be applied to
limit the meaning of "obligations" to such as are, like bonds, secured, it is more likely
that the use of the e.xtra word, "obligations," would be held to mean that something in
addition to bonds was intended. But cf. In re Willis, [1911] 2 Ch. 563, where the power
to invest in "preference stock" was held not to include the power to purchase "preference
shares," a type investment which is technically very slightly different.
25. The danger of trying to be too specific is seen in investment clauses of the type
which say: "My trustee may invest in such mortgages, corporation bonds or stoc: as it
may deem advisable, it being my wish that my trustee shall not be confined to legal in-
vestments." A literal reading of the language would preclude investment in government
bonds, ground rents, or debentures, although clearly the testatrix wished to give a full
power.
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of investment operates to prevent investment in legals generally." Where
the will announces firmly "I direct my trustee to invest in preferred stocks"
or "my trustee shall invest in preferred stocks," it is probable that a court
will hold that preferred stocks only are to be purchased. 7 But if the will or
deed of trust says instead "I authorize my trustee to invest in preferred
stocks," or "my trustee may invest in preferred stocks," it is more likely that
a court will hold that preferred stocks may be bought along with any legal
list securities.28 Careful draftsmanship can readily avoid this emphasis
placed upon a distinction of words. "Preferred stocks only" would accom-
plish one result, while "preferred stocks and legal securities" would protect
the trustee in the broader investment policy.
A variant on the same problem is presented by the trust instrument which
says: "To invest . . .at discretion, without confining my Trustee to what
are known as Legal Investments. I specifically confer upon my Trustee the
right to invest in preferred stocks." The first sentence gives a full power and
the second sentence is purely permissive. Yet the rule expressio unius est
exclusio alterius seems to require that preferred stocks be the only non-legal
investments in this trust. If the testator had desired investment in non-
legals generally, his mention of preferred stocks is unnecessary and meaning-
less.
Somewhat similar to the investment clause which attempts to set up a
special standard for investments is the clause which sets out either a legal or
a full power but then goes on to express a preference of the testator for
certain types of investment. Such language is litigated very infrequently,
but it puts the trustee in an embarrassing position. Suppose the founder
26. E.g., compare In re Shafer's Will, 69 N.Y.S.2d 446 (Surr. Ct. 1947),
with President & Directors v. Erlandsen, 36 N. Y. S.2d 136 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd per
curiam 266 App. Div. 883, 43 N. Y. S.2d 639 (2d Dep't 1943). "If the statute fixing the
legal list states that a trustee may invest in any of the securities named, unless expressly
prohibited by the settlor, a direction by the settlor to invest in a named security does not
exclude the power to invest in the listed investments. An implied prohibition is not
enough. But where there is no such statutory demand for an express prohibition of the
legal list, a direction by the settlor to invest in government bonds, or real estate mort-
gages, or any other specific security, naturally impliedly excludes a power to invest in
any other securities, whether mentioned on the legal list or not." 3 BoGar § 683.
27. Cf. it re Shaw's Estate, 122 N. J. Eq. 536, 195 Atl. 525 (Ch. 1937) ; Matter of
Ir-win's Estate, 59 Misc. 143, 112 N. Y. Supp. 205 (Surr. Ct. 1908) ; In rc Mendel's Will,
164 Wis. 136, 159 N. W. 806 (1916). In Nola's Estate, 333 Pa. 106, 3 A.2d 326 (1939),
where the instrument said: "I order and direct ... (that real estate be converted)
" the court said that the words used were "... as clear, as unambiguous, and as
imperative as any words in the English language could be," id. at 108, 3 A.2d at 328, and
held that the trustee was not permitted to use his discretion as to the wisdom of sale.
28. E.g., In re Channing's Estate, 129 Misc. 393, 222 N.Y. Supp. 351 (Surr. Ct. 1927)
In re Warren, [1939] Ch. 684; see In re Hamersley's Estate, 152 Misc. 903, 909, 274
N.Y. Supp. 303, 310 (Surr. Ct. 1934) ; Falls v. Carruthers, 20 Tenn. App. 681, 690, 103
S.W.2d 605, 611 (1936). But cf. In re Bruen's Estate, 83 N. Y. S.2d 197 (Surr. Ct. 1948).
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of See Right Spectacles Co. gives his trustee full power but adds: "I hope
that a large part of this trust is invested in stock of the See Right Spectacles
Co." Years after the donor's death the future of See Right looks so cloudy
that the trustee sells the stock of the company he is holding, and invests
in other securities. If the trustee is wrong, and See Right continues pros-
perous while the new securities decline in value, it will be difficult to explain
in a surcharge action why the donor's wish was disregarded.02 And yet the
precatory language of the investment clause is little protection to the trustee
if he continues to hold the See Right shares against his better judgment and
the shares become worthless.--
Another familiar type of precatory language is: "It is my wish that the
trustee shall consider safety of principal rather than a high rate of return
when making investments." This language is almost meaningless. Trustees
strive to keep a balance between the life tenant and the remaindermen, but
principal emphasis is always placed on preserving intact the corpus of the
trust.31 The donor who really wishes a greater degree of safety than is usual
29. "Testators in making disposition of property frequently use the word 'desire' as
the equivalent of 'direct' and such is its ordinary interpretation in the law of wills." In re
Gardner's Estate, 89 Colo. 523, 528, 4 P2d 686, 608 (1931). Accord: In re Rolston's
Estate, 162 Misc. 194, 294 N. Y. Supp. 112 (Surr. Ct. 1937) ; cf. In re Olcott's Will, 163
Misc. 890, 293 N. Y. Supp. 267 (Surr. Ct. 1937) (words of testator that it was his "wish"
that trustees not make any investment to which beneficiaries should object held, in light
of rest of will, to be mandatory).
30. Where the donor spoke of his "intention and preference" for a particular course
of action by his fiduciaries, his language was held to be precatory, not creating more
than a certain moral obligation on the part of the executors. I re Stulman's Will, 146
Misc. 861, 263 N. Y. Supp. 197 (Surr. Ct. 1933). Accord: Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown,
105 Conn. 261, 135 Atl. 555 (1926) ("It is my wish . . . my request . .") ; In re Buck-
ley's Will, 135 Mlisc. 156, 237 N. Y. Supp. 293 (Surr. Ct. 1929) ("I also wish .. .") ; In
re Scott's Will, 204 N. Y. Supp. 478 (Surr. Ct. 1924) ("... . it is my desire.. .");
Lindsay's Estate, 211 Pa. 536, 166 At. 848 (1933) ("It is my wish . . ."). In Brown v.
French, 125 Mass. 410 (1878), the investment clause told the trustees to "... use their
own judgment as to investing the moneys arising from my estate; at the same time I
would recommend to them the propriety of keeping at least one half of the same in-
vested on mortgage of unencumbered real estate, as I think well of that kind of security."
The court refused to hold the trustees liable for completely ignoring the testator's wish
and holding no mortgages whatsoever.
31. In Falls v. Carruthers, 20 Tenn. App. 681, 103 S. WV2d 605 (1936), 15 Ta::?.
L. REV. 169 (1938), the trustee was empowered ". . . to make such investments as he
may see fit, looking always to the safety of the investment, rather than to a high rate of
interest.. ." The court called the last half of the clause "purely advisory or precatory;"
id. at 691, 103 S. W.2d at 611, and held that the trustee had not exceeded his power in
purchasing non-legals.
But see HoLDaN, EsTATEs U.'DER VILLS AND TRusr AOrEFEir s 37 (1928), who
says of the type clause under discussion: "It is not necessary, for even without it the
trust company would make safety of the principal a first consideration. But to make this
clear to the beneficiaries, and to sustain the trustee in its insistence upon safety as a first
consideration, it is sometimes advisable to insert such a clause."
A donor who wished to have safety of principal ignored and a high income made the
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can easily limit his trustee to the ultrasound investments of the legal list,
or even to government bonds only. Language such as that quoted is of no
value as a guide to the trustee, but can embarrass him considerably if he
suffers a loss on investments which hindsight may regard as having been
speculative.
Full Power
Where the donor decides on a grant of full power, it should be the sim-
plest of matters for his lawyer to implement that decision. In some states
it is, for the trust instrument need but remain silent and the law will give
the trustee substantially equivalent discretion-that of a prudent man
managing his own investments.3 2 Where a legal list is in existence, the same
objectives can be attained only by drafting a most forceful clause which
makes it clear that there is to be no limit on the powers of the trustee. 3
Form books abound with clauses aimed at conferring the broadest of in-
vestment powers,14 and although many may be criticized as overly in-
volved, 35 they may be successful in establishing about as much discretion
sole criterion for investment would probably have difficulty in drafting an investment
clause sufficiently explicit to overcome the inherent conservatism of the type persons and
corporations that act as trustees. In particular, a corporate trustee would undoubtedly
regard it as abominable public relations to have a trust completely wiped out by bad In-
vestments, even though the donor specifically directed a speculative and hazardous in-
vestment policy. Probably the only way to insure that a high return would be prcferrcd
to safety of principal is the unpalatable expedient of including in the investment clause
specific directions as to the precise class of investments to be chosen.
32. See note 14, supra; note 36 infra.
33. Investment in non-legals "may be authorized by the creator of the trust, but
where such a provision is relied on, it is for the trustee to establish it with the utmost
clearness, and when shown it will be strictly construed .... The power ought not to be
sustained upon conjecture, nor inferred from . . . express grant of discretion as to mat-
ters not relating to the management of the fund. The presumption is against the existence
of such a power, and all doubts should be resolved against the party asserting it." Barker's
Estate, 159 Pa. 518, 528-9, 28 Atl. 365, 367 (1894). Accord: Babbitt v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 745, 66 AtI. 1076 (Ch. 1907) ; Matter of Robbins, 135 Misc. 220, 237
N. Y. Supp. 409 (Surr. Ct. 1929); Taylor's Estate, 277 Pa. 518, 121 Ati. 310 (1923).
Where alternative interpretations of the investment power are possible, courts will adopt
the more conservative of the two. Equitable Trust Co. v. Snader, 20 Del. Ch. 278, 174
At. 132 (1934). A similar principle seems to guide trustees in states such as Texas,
where the custom of the community is regarded as the most important limitation on
trust investments, and where investments of a type not customary for trustees in that state
will be made only if they are specifically authorized in the trust instrument. King, Triest
Investments in Texas, 21 TExAs L. Rv. 223 (1943).
34. See, e.g., the proposals made in Stephenson, Trust Investment Provisions Which
Have Worked Well, 5 LAw & CONTEMp. PROB. 377 (1938).
35. Ibid. The following form, recommended by a leading trust company, is typical:
"The investment of the principal or corpus of the estate hereby given in trust is left to
the discretion of the Trustee, with the view of thereby obtaining a larger income there-
from than would be received were it invested solely in legal securities. The trustee shall
not be hampered by any laws or rules of law which now exist or may hereafter exist in
[Vol. 58: 288
TRUST INVESTMENT CLAUSES
as the trustee holds under the "prudent man" rules." But courts from state
to state have constructed such a variety of traps that unwary scriveners are
constantly finding that language which they had thought to be unambiguous
could be interpreted to mean something other than full power.
One common investment clause which has caused difficulty to many
trustees and courts is that which gives the trustee discretion over invest-
ments without specifically exempting him from the requirements of the
legal list. The better recent decisions have taken the word "discretion" as a
peg on which to hang full power for the trustee.Y7 This view is of such
recent vintage in many jurisdictions that it is likely to be too strictly con-
strued by the trustee; the same trust company which regards a direction to
invest "at discretion" as granting full power may continue to regard itself as
confined to legals where the words of the instrument are "at pleasure." But
most courts have recognized that such phrases as "as he deems best" and
"as may be for the best interests of my estate" are synonyms for "at dis-
cretion." Is
regard to the character of investments to be made by trustees, but shall invest the principal
or corpus in whatever manner it may see fit, using the same discretion as in making its
own corporate investments, without being in any way responsible or liable for any losses
or depreciation in value that may result therefrom." Though it would probably be suc-
cessful in insulating the trustee from all responsibility-if indeed that is desirable-there
is nothing really wrong with such a clause, except that it could have been said much more
simply and easily.
36. Moore, supra note 2, says, at 657: "A power to invest in 'non-legals' ... probably
gives the fiduciary even greater opportunity for exercise of discretion than the trustee
has in a prudent man state." Moore's argument apparently would be that the trustee in
a "prudent man" state has an affirmative duty of care and prudence, while the trustee in-
vesting under a grant of discretion in a legal list state is liable only in case of supine
negligence or willful default. Although the limits of a discretionary power are admittedly
rough, it seems probable that the distinction suggested is mainly on the verbal level, and
that results in similar factual situations involving the "prudent man" rule in one instance
and a grant of discretion in the other would not be significantly different. Cf. Lib2rty
Title & Trust Co. v. Plews, 142 N. J. Eq. 493, 60 A.2d 630 (Ch. 194S). But cf. Mfiller v.
Pender, 93 N. H. 1, 34 A.2d 663 (1943).
37. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Worth, 19 Del. Ch. 314, 167 Adt. 843 (1933) ('... to
invest .. . from time to time in, what in the discretion of the trustees are, good invest-
ments") ; Pennsylvania Company for Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities v.
Board of National Missions of the Presbyterian Church, 139 N. J. Eq. 71, E0 A.! 393
(Ch. 1946) (". . . discretion . . .") ; Duncdee v. Butler, 30 Misc. 51, 62 N. Y. Supp. 921
(Sup. Ct. 1899) ('" . . at his own discretion") ; Carr's Estate, 355 Pa. 43S, 50 A2d 330
(1947) ( . . full power and authority in their discretion to invest..."); 3 Bcmuur § M2;
2 ScoTT § 227.14.
In 1929 Washington provided by statute that a grant of discretion as to investment
should carry a power to buy non-legals, VAsH. Rnv. STAT. § 3255p (Remington, 1932),
but that provision was repealed and its content wnas not reenacted when substantial changes
were made in the State Banking Law in 1941. WASH. REv. STAT. § 3255-19 (Remington,
Supp. 1941).
38. Title Guarantee Loan & Trust Co. v. Woodward, 238 Ala. 304, 191 So. 363 (1939)
(. .. as it deems best. .. ."), 1 ALA. LAwr rE 65 (1940); City Bank Farmers Trust
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Such a broad view is, however, far from being universal. Moreover, the
argument is still plausible that a grant of discretion without specific waiver
of the legal list gives the trustee discretion to choose only among legals.1
And if the investment clause happens, as many do, to include the phrase
"from time to time" in an authorization to invest as the trustee deems best,
it may be held that the discretion runs only to the time of investing, and
not to the type of investments to be made. 4 The effect of this kind of gen-
eral grant of discretion may be limited, too, in places where statute or custom
forbids investment in unusual kinds of securities-particularly stocks-
unless they are specifically named in the investment clause.
41
Co. v. Lewis, 122 Conn. 384, 189 Atl. 178 (1937) (". . as they may consider safe. .
Armstead v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 180 Ga. 148, 177 S. E. 787 (1935) (". . . complete au-
thority to make investments according to its best judgment.. . .") ; Matter of Baclus,
175 Misc. 13, 22 N. Y. S.2d 613 (Surr. Ct. 1940) (". . . as he may be advised ... ")
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Leach, 168 Misc. 526, 5 N. Y. S.2d 628 (Sup. Ct.
1938) (". . . any other property, either real or personal, that it may think best") ; Matter
of Leavitt, 135 Misc. 387, 238 N. Y. Supp. 109 (Surr. Ct. 1929) (". . . as they may select
as being reasonably safe...."); Matter of Leonard's Will, 118 Misc. 598, 193 N.Y.
Supp. 916 (Surr. Ct. 1922) ("... to keep the principal thereof invested so as to bring in
the largest income compatible with reasonable safety of the principal. . . !'); Willis v.
Braucher, 79 Ohio St. 290, 87 N. E. 185 (1909) (". . . in such manner as she or they may
think best. . . ."); Greenawalt's Estate, 343 Pa. 413, 21 A.2d 890 (1941) (". . . as may
be for the best interests of my estate") ; NosSAMAN, TRUST ADMINISTRATION AND TAXA.
TioN § 459 (1945).
39. Cf. Michigan Home Missionary Society v. Corning, 164 Mich. 395, 129 N. W.
686 (1911) (". . . their best skill and discretion... .") ; Brown v. Brown, 72 N. J. Eq.
667, 65 Atl. 739 (Ch. 1907) (". . . sound, productive securities, such as they may deem
best....."); Matter of Hall, 164 N. Y. 196, 58 N. E. 11 (1900) (". . . any security,
real or personal, which they may deem for the benefit of my estate... .") ; Matter of
Carnell, 260 App. Div. 287, 21 N. Y. S.2d 376 (3d Dep't 1940), aff'd per euriam 284
N. Y. 624, 29 N. E.2d 935 (1940) (". . . other securities purchased in the exercise of
their good judgment and discretion. All such securities, however, ... to be always well
selected, and well secured securities, as distinguished from speculative securities or in-
vestments"); Pabst v. Goodrich, 133 Wis. 43, 113 N. W. 398 (1907) ('... as they shall
deem best. . .. "). See Stephenson, .supra note 34, at 382.
Analogously, the investment clause of a trust fund which was to be ". , . reinvested
in their discretion ... in other real estate or securities" was interpreted as giving discre-
tion only between realty and personalty, with no power to purchase non-legals, in Equitable
Trust Co. v. Snader, 20 Del. Ch. 278, 184 Atl. 132 (1934). Where an investment clause
directed investment in ". . . first class railroad bonds or stock or any other such se-
curities as they in their best judgment shall deem proper," the court applied the principle
of noscitur a sociis to hold that "other securities or property" extends only to legals. In
re Harbeck's Estate, 142 Misc. 57, 254 N. Y. Supp. 312 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
On the other hand, it has been said that a grant of discretion would be a useless legal
formality if it were interpreted to mean only discretion to choose from among legals.
City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Lewis, 122 Conn. 384, 189 Atl. 178 (1937).
40. Babbitt v. Fidelity Trust Co., 72 N. 3. Eq. 745, 66 Atl. 1076 (Ch. 1907) ; cl. In re
Hazeldine [1918] 1 Ch. 433.
41. E.g., Sellers v. Milford, 101 Ind. App. 500, 198 N. E. 456 (1935), 12 IND. L. J.
80 (1936), where the trustee was surcharged for purchase of common stocks under an
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Even where the language would otherwise seem to create a full power,
certain words tend to produce strong and confused reactions from courts.
The word "securities" is one of these; technically a share of stock is not a
"security," 42 and for years courts worried over whether a trustee had ex-
ceeded his authority in purchasing stocks where the investment clause men-
tioned "securities." In everyday parlance of both laymen and la-wyers, a
share of stock is certainly a "security," and almost all courts now recognize
this.
43
An even more troublesome word is "interest." Although it is not uncom-
mon to speak of "interest" when what is really meant is "income" or perhaps
"rate of return," 44 most courts will still hold that if a donor speaks of
"interest-bearing securities" or of putting money "at interest," he means to
prohibit his trustee from purchasing preferred or common stock." In con-
struing "interest," the court may go beyond the words of the instrument
themselves, and allow purchase of stock where it finds other evidence that
the donor meant that stocks should be held-e.g., if he left much of his own
investment clause which directed the investment of the corpus so as to produce as much
income as was safe and reasonable. See Stephenson, supra note 34, at 382; King, mipra
note 33.
42. In re Mildeberger's Will, 212 App. Div. 727, 209 N. Y. Supp. 649 (1925).
43. "In common parlance, among all classes of people familiar with 'securities', bank-
ers, brokers, investors, speculators and lav.wyers, the term is used as signifying all classes
of investments." McGraw's Estate, 337 Pa. 93, 95, 10 A.2d 377, 373 (1940). Accord:
City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Lewis, 122 Conn. 384, 189 AtL 178 (1937); Equitable
Trust Co. v. M1arshall, 25 Del. Ch. 238, 17 A.2d 13 (1940) ; Fox v. Harris, 141 Md. 495,
119 Atl. 256 (1922) ; In re First National Bank & Trust Co., 202 Minn. 205, -277 N. W.
909 (1938); Fairleigh v. Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co., 335 Mo. 360, 73 S. WV.2d
248 (1934) ; Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Lowy, 123 N. J. Eq. 90, 196 At. 369 (Ch. 1933) ;
Matter of Loose's Will, 167 Alisc. 764, 4 N. Y. S.2d 611 (Surr. Ct. 1938) ; Wood's Es-
tate, 130 Pa. Super. 397, 197 AtI. 638 (1938), 86 U. oF PA. L. Rnv. 791; R~sT, ._=T,
TRusTs § 227, comment i (1935) ; cf. Hanson v. First National Bank, 217 Ma. 426, 116
So. 127 (1928) ; Pennsylvania Company for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities
v. Board of National Missions of the Presbyterian Church, 139 N. J. Eq. 71, 50 A.2d 393
(Ch. 1946) ("investments" held to include stocks) ; Matter of Hoaglund, 74 N. Y. S2d
156 (Surr. Ct. 1947) ("securities" held to include shares of a common trust fund); ice
Miller v. Pender, 93 N. H. 1, 4, 34 A2d 663, 664 (1943).
But see 3 BOGaRT § 633, which says: "An authorization to invest in 'securities' ex-
cludes corporate stocks .. ." And NosSAMAxA, TRUST ADmrNsoATio., A:,D TAXATion
§ 459 (1945), says that stocks may or may not be held to be a "security."
44. E.g., Smith v. Southern Foundry Co., 166 Ky. 203, 179 S. NV. 205 (1915), where
a share of preferred stock provided that it N.'as to bear "interest" at a certain rate.
45. "While 'interest' may be used loosely to denote income, in its accurate sense it
designates income derived from a debt or obligation." Berge's Estate, 30 Pa. D. & C. 549,
558 (1937) (stocks not permitted where investment clause spoke of ". . . safe securities
at interest"); Williams v. Cobb, 219 Fed. 663 (2d Cir. 1914), aff'd 242 U. S. 307 (1916) ;
Kinney v- Uglow, 163 Ore. 539, 9S P.2d 1006 (1940) (trustee surcharged for purchasing
stocks, even with approval of court, where instrument spoke of ". .. some safe, interest-
hearing security, approved by the court") ; Copes Estate, 351 Pa. 514, 41 A2d 617 (1945),
infra note 47; 3 BoGmET § 633.
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estate in stocks.46 If the donor was a bank president who might be expected
to have known the difference between "interest" and "income," the court
will probably refuse to allow the purchase of stocks. 7 And it is, of course,
common, where "interest" is mentioned, to examine the remainder of the
will for any indications it may give as to how the word was used by the
donor.4" But while these factors may serve occasionally to prevent unin-
tended results, it is more probable that the most forcefully worded grant of
discretion to the trustee will be held not to authorize investment in stocks
if "interest" is mentioned.
In some jurisdictions words such as "good" or "safe" or "sound" have an
emotive tinge. In all probability a court would allow full power to a trustee
told ". . . to invest in good sound securities without being confined to
legals." 49 But if the investment clause should be weaker to the extent of
saying only ". . . to invest in good sound securities as he may deem best,"
the judicial reaction to an argument that full power was granted might be
different. The court would probably come to the aid of what it regards as
the donor's best interests with such language as: ". . . it would be a shock-
ing interpretation of his intention and his language to hold that he meant
something less sound than what the law regards as sound." 50 The trustee
would then be confined to legals.5s Another court in a somewhat similar case
46. E.g., Poor v. Hodge, 311 Mass. 312, 41 N. E.2d 21 (1942).
47. The testator's experience as a bank president seems to have influenced the court
in Cope's Estate, 351 Pa. 514, 518, 41 A.2d 617, 619 (1945), but the court makes the
broad statement that: "No distortion of the language quoted can convert the word 'In-
terest' to 'income', nor can common stocks be considered 'interest paying'." Id. at 518,
41 A2d at 618. The investment clause read: ".... to make investments in any interest
paying securities they deem good and safe, without being restricted to . . . [legals]." Thie
decision of the court is approved in a very thorough Note in 31 VA. L. Rav. 922 (1945).
48. E.g., Gillingham's Estate, 353 Pa. 493, 46 A.2d 269 (1946). The instrument in
that case permitted investment ". . . in such securities as my said Executors and Trustees
, * may deem prudent, without restriction to so-called legal investments, my object be-
ing to secure, if possible, a rate of interest higher than can be obtained by investment in
securities designated by law for the investment of Trust monies... ." The court said that
properly to interpret the investment power it was necessary to look to the four corners
of the will, and since "income" and "dividends" were mentioned elsewhere in the instru-
ment, the court decided that common stocks were a proper investment despite the men-
tion of "interest."
49. The language quoted in the text is not uncommon in trust instruments. No case
has been found in which it has been construed, but every decision on analogous language
indicates that such a clause undoubtedly gives full power.
50. Hale's Estate, 347 Pa. 177, 178, 32 A.2d 20, 21 (1943).
51. E.g., Brown v. Brown, 72 N. J. Eq. 667, 65 Atl. 739 (Ch. 1907) (". . . sound,
productive securities, such as they may deem best . . .") ; cf. Matter of Carnell, 260 App.
Div. 287, 21 N. Y. S.2d 376 (3d Dep't 1940), aff'd per curiarn 284 N. Y. 624, 29 N. E.2d
935 (1940) (". . . other securities purchased in the exercise of their good judgment and
discretion. All such securities . . . to be always well selected, and well secured securities,
as distinguished from speculative securities or investments") ; Matter of Morris, 153 Misc.
905, 276 N. Y. Supp. 254 (Surr. Ct. 1934) (". . . in safe and stable interest bearing
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has declared that the legal list provided for absolute safety and that the
testator probably only wanted reasonable or relative safety3 2 The rationale
arising from the facts in that case might well be applied more extensively.
Interesting metaphysical distinctions can be made when words such as
"good" or "sound" are used. If they describe the type investment the
trustee may make, he will, as has been seen, probably be confined to legals.
But if the language should be ". . . to invest in such securities as in the
judgment of the trustee are good and sound," it is reasonably sure that the
trustee would be allowed to exercise full power.63 Such a distinction seems
more appropriate to a philosopher or a semanticist than to a lawyer.
securities, and in such manner as will best serve the interest of my said children"). But
cf. Duncklee v. Butler, 30 Misc. 58, 62 N. Y. Supp. 921 (Sup. Ct. 1899) ("... heep the
same invested in good, sound, dividend-paying securities.... He may also invest and re-
invest the trust estate at discretion").
It is easy to understand why doctrinal confusion has arisen in courts which insist
upon deciding cases on a conceptualistic basis. Where donors have used adjectives such
as "good" or "safe" or "sound" to describe the type securities to be purchased without
having added any language to indicate discretion, it is difficult to find any intent that the
trustee should go beyond the legal list in investment. Matter of Robbins, 135 Misc. 220,
237 N. Y. Supp. 409 (Surr. Ct. 1929) (".... safely and conservatively invested...");
Hale's Estate, 347 Pa. 177, 32 A2d 20 (1943) ("... good sound securities ..
Berge's Estate, 30 Pa. D. & C. 549 (1937) ... some safe securities at interest ..
Plate's Estate, 30 Pa. Dist. 902 (1921) (".. good securities . . :'). Contra: Fox v.
Harris, 141 Md. 495, 119 AtL. 256 (1922) ... good, safe securities ... ).
Then when the court is confronted with an investment clause authorizing "... good
sound securities as he may deem best," it has its choice of two perfectly logical but quite
contradictory syllogisms. The first syllogism takes the incontrovertible major premise
that ". . . legal securities as he may deem best" is a grant of discretion to choose only
among legals. And granting the minor premise that ". . . good sound securities" means
"legal securities," the conclusion must follow as the night the day that "... good
sound securities as he may deem best" is a grant of discretion to choose only among legals.
The alternative syllogism starts with the equally incontrovertible major premise that
"... good sound securities without being confined to legals" is a grant of full power, and
takes the minor premise illustrated in notes 37 and 38 supra that '... as he may deem
best" means ". . . without being confined to legals." The conclusion then follows as
another day another night that "... good sound securities as he may deem best" is a
grant of full power.
Confronted with this neat dilemma most courts have taken the conservative course
and have adopted the first syllogism, confining the trustee to legals. That such a deci-
sion leaves the law of those jurisdictions confused and inconsistent is only another illus-
tration of the invalidity of the conceptual method of reaching a judicial decision.
52. In re Leonard's Will, 118 M isc. 598, 193 N. Y. Supp. 916 (Surr. Ct. 1922).
53. Cf. State National Bank of Texarkana -v. Murphy, 207 Ark. 263, 1SO S. W2d
118 (1944) (".. . such stocks, bonds, or other income-bearing securities, or other per-
sonal property as my said executor may deem safe and desirable") ; City Bank Farmers
Trust Co. v. Lewis, 122 Conn. 384, 189 At. 178 (1937) (" .. such other securities be-
sides those recognized by law as they may consider safe.. ."); Wilmington Trust Co.
v. Worth, 19 Del. Ch. 314, 167 Atl. 848 (1933) ("... to invest... in, what in the
discretion of the trustees are, good investments"); Matter of Kane, 25 N. Y. S2d 903
(Surr. Ct. 1941) (.... such securities as to it or them shall seem safe and proper") ; In
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Once the full-power clause has been framed, it still may be desirable,
especially in stringent jurisdictions, to add to it certain additional specific
authorizations in order to give the trustee as free a rein as possible. As
pointed out in the section on special powers, however, these extra clauses
must make it clear that the grants are not exclusionary'. 4 For example, for
the purpose of diversifying investments, in smaller trusts especially, it may
be desirable to employ modern devices such as common trust funds and
mortgage participations whose use in the absence of express authorization,
might be challenged as improper delegation of powers by the trustee. Again,
there are a number of subsidiary powers of pragmatic importance whose
exercise might be contested in the absence of specific authorization. For
example, the trustee may be empowered to employ an investment counsel
and pay him from the estate. Without definite sanction, the trustee might
be surcharged for such payments, since he is normally expected to select the
investments himself. Such specific grants of authority however can be kept
to a minimum if the general grant of power is sufficiently broad, and in any
event, should themselves be drafted as models of studied simplicity.
In General
A good investment clause is not hard to draft."5 Most of the errors in
draftsmanship arise when the donor and his scrivener have not thought
through the effect which the investment clause will have. Once it has been
decided how much power to grant, a simple statement56 will usually suffice
to extend that power clearly and unambiguously.57 A form book can be of
re Leavitt, 135 Misc. 387, 238 N. Y. Supp. 109 (Surr. Ct. 1929) (". . . other income-bear-
ing securities as they may select as being reasonably safe for the investment of trust
funds").
54. See pp. 295-6 stpra.
55. "It is not difficult to define broadly the investment powers of the trustees . . . in
such words that no doubt can arise, and that the founder's lawful intent can be adopted by
the trustee, and by the court." Morris, Problems in the Drafting and Administration of
Trusts, 26 MARQ. L. R-v. 57, 62 (1942).
56. Investment clauses present a perfect example of the type of draftsmanship com-
plained of by Schaefler, Trust Agreements Are Stuffy, 86 TRusTs & ESTATES 222 (1948) :
"Trust agreements are stuffy. They are needlessly involved, complicated and incompre-
hensible. They abound in circumlocutions and tautologies .... Must the meaning and pur-
pose of the trust provisions be obfuscated by legal pidgin English? Can we not dispense
with the 'whereas,' the 'witnesseth' and the parties of the innumerable part? Can we not
translate the lengthy and involved clauses of the trust agreement, with their esoteric and
cabalistic meanings, into the human and humane documents their creators intended them to
be-literate, concise, understandable? Is it our idea that we 'must make the medicle taste
bad' before the client will believe he is getting a really good legal job?" Schaefler suggests,
at 223, the following investment clause: "You may retain any of the securities on the at-
tached list without diversifying them, or you may sell them and invest the proceeds in any
stocks, bonds, or other securities, even if they are not specified as being legal for trust in-
vestments"
57. For a full power, for example, an English writer suggests: "My trustees may in-
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assistance provided that the lawyer drafting the instrument understands the
effect of the language used, and does not blindly copy suggested clausesrS
The advice often given to use language which has been frequently construed
by the courts is likely to be dangerous; probably the best investment
clauses are drafted with such clarity and so simply that the courts have had
no occasion to interpret their meaning.
CONCLUSION
A system which wisely leaves to each man the right to dispose of his goods
as he will implies a donor making a considered, informed decision as to the
investment power which he wishes to give his trustee. It implies an ability
to translate the wishes of the donors into clear and unambiguous language
vest the trust fund in any form of property they think fit as if they were a single absolute
owner thereof." Inmestincnt Clauses, 90 SoL. J. 413 (1946). In the course of a survey made
by an Editor of the YALE LAw JOuruIAL of the investment clauses of more than 4500 trusts
administered by an outstanding trust company, only one trust w.-as encountered in which the
investment clause had the same refreshing simplicity as that suggested by the English
scholar. That one clause merely said: "To purchase any kind of property whatsoever."
While this undoubtedly gives a full power in the jurisdiction in which the trust is located,
a specific exemption of the requirement of legals is advisable for most trusts.
"My trustee may make investments other than those legal for fiduciaries," or "to invest,
reinvest, and keep invested, without being confined to legal investments," or "to invest with-
out limitation to so-called 'legal investments' under the law of any State"--language of this
sort, with its countless variants, is seen in many trusts. Where such language is present the
trustee can invest according to his best judgment without having to get expensive opinions
of counsel on the interpretation of the investment clause and without worrying about ever
being surcharged for buying non-legals.
The clause suggested by HoLDESN, EsTATEs UNDER WILLS AzD TnRs.r AGnr -u-rTs 37
(1928) seems satisfactory, even if somewhat more expansive than necessary: "The Trustee
shall not, in making investments, be to any extent restricted to those by statutory law made
available for trust investment, and may make any investment in stocks, bonds, mortgages or
property which a prudent business man, exercising ordinary care, might make of his orn
funds." The addition which Holden recommends be made to that clause would add con-
siderably to the administrative difficulty, and is quite undesirable: "Provided however that
unless an investment is one which is qualified as an investment of trust funds, no investment
shall be made by the Trustee in securities, whether bonds or stocks, which are subject to
any existing substantial amount of first liens or charges, superior in lien to such securities."
Ibid. The problem of determining what is a "substantial amount" of prior liens would
cause much anguish to the trustee, and it is even possible that a hostile court could con-
strue the proviso as forbidding the purchase of any common stocks whatsoever in com-
panies with preferred stock or bonds outstanding. The donor should have sufficient confi-
dence in the ability and good judgment of his trustee to let the trustee determine vhether
senior obligations are such as to make an investment unwise.
58. The following investment clause, drafted by a very competent metropolitan law
firm, is an outstanding example of "formbookitis"--the dread disease of using a form book
without thinking about what is being said: "In trust upon the decease of the last survivor
of my sons to invest in other than what are knowm as legal investments provided that this
power shall not be exercisable in such way as to permit the purchase of shares of stock of
corporations or investments in other than bonds of corporations or individuals secured by
mortgages or collateral trust agreements or provisions of like character."
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in the trust instrument. And it implies courts and trustees who will interpret
this language in such a way as to carry out the spirit of the testator's di-
rections, 9 rather than base their construction of the instrument on hoary
precedents, outmoded declarations of legislative policy,"0 or quibblesome
semantics. There is no reason why these implications must so often represent
conditions contrary to fact.
59. An extreme example of a court frustrating the intent of the donor is In re Safe De-
posit Bank of Pottsville, 19 Pa. D. & C. 695 (1933). In that case the court interpreted
some fairly ambiguous language as giving only a legal power despite testimony of the set-
tlor himself that by the language he meant to give his trustee a full power. The sound rule
that the investment clause may not be modified by parol evidence, 3 BOGERT § 681, does not
seem necessarily to conflict with letting the settlor himself be of assistance in determining
his own intent.
60. One writer actually finds it desirable to resolve ambiguities in investment clauses
by use of the anachronistic policy of conservatism contained in the legal lists. Exchlsionl
and Application of Statutory Investment Norms by the Instrument Creating the Trust, 19
IowA L. Rxv. 441 (1934). That article argues that courts are too quick to find a grant of
discretion, and should confine trustees to the legal list unless the testator specifically states
that the legal limits are not to apply. The explanation for the position taken by that article
probably is that it was written at the height of the depression when many trusts were ex-
periencing large losses on non-legal securities.
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